While blitzkrieg was a tactic focused on speed, it would be wrong for any bedroom strategist (like myself) to focus on that characteristic alone and to conclude that speed is all that matters. It is definitely important, but it is important to look deeper at this tactic in order to understand why speed was important in the first place, the core principles behind the strike and how you can employ equivalent tactics in the business world.
When the selection process was complete, a work group of prisoners called the ‘Kanada Kommando’ collected the belongings of victims and took them to the ‘Kanada’ warehouse facility for sorting and transporting back to Germany. To the prisoners, Canada was a country that symbolised wealth. They, therefore, gave the ironic name Kanada (the German spelling of Canada) to the warehouse area as it was full of possessions, clothing and jewellery.
The most infamous doctor at Auschwitz was Josef Mengele, the "Angel of Death", who worked in Auschwitz II from 30 May 1943, at first in the gypsy family camp.[127] Particularly interested in performing research on identical twins, dwarfs, and those with hereditary disease, Mengele set up a kindergarten in barracks 29 and 31 for children he was experimenting on, and for all Romani children under six, where they were given better food rations.[128] From May 1944, he would select twins and dwarfs during selection on the Judenrampe,[129] reportedly calling for twins with "Zwillinge heraus!" ("twins step forward!").[130] He and other doctors (the latter prisoners) would measure the twins' body parts, photograph them, and subject them to dental, sight and hearing tests, x-rays, blood tests, surgery, and blood transfusions between them.[131] Then he would have them killed and dissected.[129] Kurt Heissmeyer, another German doctor and SS officer, took 20 Jewish children from Auschwitz to use in pseudoscientific medical experiments at the Neuengamme concentration camp.[132] In April 1945, the children were killed by hanging to conceal the project.[133]

Blitzkrieg, as practiced by the Wehrmacht during World War II, was a tactical action executed with extreme competence. It involved the coordination of all forces and it had a very small margin of error. But this coordination that made it such a successful tactic is the main thing missed when Blitzkrieg is referenced in day-to-day conversations that focus only on the speed by which a certain position is secured. All the other items we discussed (initiative, focus and tempo) fall apart without this synchronization.


During the Battle of France in 1940, the 4th Armoured Division (Major-General Charles de Gaulle) and elements of the 1st Army Tank Brigade (British Expeditionary Force) made probing attacks on the German flank, pushing into the rear of the advancing armoured columns at times. This may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the German advance. Those attacks combined with Maxime Weygand's Hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: deployment in depth, permitting enemy or "shoulders" of a penetration was essential to channelling the enemy attack, and artillery, properly employed at the shoulders, could take a heavy toll of attackers. While Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to successfully develop these strategies, resulting in France's capitulation with heavy losses, they characterised later Allied operations. At the Battle of Kursk the Red Army employed a combination of defence in great depth, extensive minefields, and tenacious defence of breakthrough shoulders. In this way they depleted German combat power even as German forces advanced.[citation needed] The reverse can be seen in the Russian summer offensive of 1944, Operation Bagration, which resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center. German attempts to weather the storm and fight out of encirclements failed due to the Russian ability to continue to feed armoured units into the attack, maintaining the mobility and strength of the offensive, arriving in force deep in the rear areas, faster than the Germans could regroup.[citation needed]
"Blitzkrieg" is a German compound meaning "lightning war". The word did not enter official terminology of the Wehrmacht either before or during the war, even though it was already used in the military Journal "Deutsche Wehr" in 1935, in the context of an article on how states with insufficient food and raw materials supply can win a war. Another appearance is in 1938 in the "Militär-Wochenblatt", where Blitzkrieg is defined as a "strategic attack", carried out by operational use of tanks, air force, and airborne troops. Karl-Heinz Frieser in his book 'Blitzkrieg Legende', who researched the origin of the term and found the above examples, points out that the pre-war use of the term is rare, and that it practically never entered official terminology throughout the war.
The commander of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Rudolf Höss, stated in his autobiography that in 1941 (no exact date is given) he was summoned to Berlin, where Himmler informed him that Hitler had issued an order to solve the “Jewish Question” for good, and that the order was to be implemented by the SS. “The existing extermination places in the east are unsuited to a large scale, long-term action. I have designated Auschwitz for this purpose,” Himmler said.
Adam Tooze wrote that the German economy was being prepared for a long war. The expenditure for this war was extensive and put the economy under severe strain. The German leadership were concerned less with how to balance the civilian economy and the needs of civilian consumption but to figure out how to best prepare the economy for total war. Once war had begun, Hitler urged his economic experts to abandon caution and expend all available resources on the war effort but the expansion plans only gradually gained momentum in 1941. Tooze wrote that the huge armament plans in the pre-war period did not indicate any clear-sighted blitzkrieg economy or strategy.[134]
In less than 24 hours I shall be departing with my wife and two friends for a holiday in Krakow. As a minority of one I have been outvoted on whether we should visit Auschwitz Berkenau. Very reluctantly I will go. As an ex soldier, I am hardly a shrinking violet and perhaps more aware than some of the horrors of war or even lesser conflicts. I don't need to pore over such things. But many seem to cherish a ghoulish and prurient interest in such places. They are right to remember what happened there. From such knowledge mankind just might avoid or prevent anything similar happening again...but I doubt it. Look around the world. Horrors have existed, still exist and almost certainly will happen again. The scale is not the most significant factor. One child or adult butchered with machettes, bombs or bullets or bombs or tortured to death is just as horrific. Somehow I already feel guilty for allowing myself to go. For me it is almost on a par with digging up a coffin just to observe the putrefying remains of some departed soul. Why do some feel compelled to do that...does it awake in some a compassion that they did not previously have? No number of visits to such places can possibly make anyone feel and suffer as the inmates undoubtedly did. It takes some considerable effort to understand how a post-Auschwitz society can promote and run profiteering bus tours to one of the closest places humanity has to Hell. History cannot be changed by tears. Perhaps it is a forlorn hope but we would all do well to remember such places and events and then move forwards, using our best efforts to stop the slaughters that are occurring right now. That is where our consciences and efforts are most needed.
Auschwitz-Birkenau was also a killing center and played a central role in the German effort to kill the Jews of Europe. Around the beginning of September, 1941, the SS at Auschwitz I conducted the first tests of Zyklon B as a mass murder agent, using Soviet POWs and debilitated Polish prisoners as victims. The “success” of these experiments led to the construction of a chamber in the crematorium of Auschwitz I that, like the subsequent gas chambers at Auschwitz, used Zyklon B to murder victims. The first transports of Jewish men, women, and children sent to Auschwitz as part of the “final solution” were murdered in this gas chamber (Crematorium I) in February and March 1942.
In 1944, Plaszow transitioned from a labor camp to a concentration camp and all Jews were to be sent to the death camp at Auschwitz. Schindler requested Göth allow him to relocate his factory to Brnĕnec, in the Sudetenland, and produce war goods. He was told to draw up a list of workers he wanted to take with him. With Stern’s help, Schindler created a list of 1,100 Jewish names he deemed “essential” for the new factory. Permission was granted and the factory was moved. Not wanting to contribute to the German war effort, Schindler ordered his workers to purposefully make defective products that would fail inspection. The employees spent the remaining months of the war in the factory.
On January 20, 1942, Reinhard Heydrich convened the Wannsee Conference at a lakeside villa in Berlin to organize the “final solution to the Jewish question.” Around the table were 15 men representing government agencies necessary to implement so bold and sweeping a policy. The language of the meeting was clear, but the meeting notes were circumspect:
I have only ever seen this film once, I only ever want to see this film once and I will only ever need to see this film once. It is etched on my mind. I, like many others, left in silence. I could not imagine inventing a critical analysis of this film, picking small points of detail or of style, or even scoring points off the Director. It stands alone as a monumental piece of cinema, a magnificent accomplishment.
Irena Adamowicz Gino Bartali Archbishop Damaskinos Odoardo Focherini Francis Foley Helen of Greece and Denmark Princess Alice of Battenberg Marianne Golz Jane Haining Feng-Shan Ho Wilm Hosenfeld Constantin Karadja Jan Karski Valdemar Langlet Carl Lutz Aristides de Sousa Mendes Tadeusz Pankiewicz Giorgio Perlasca Marion Pritchard Ángel Sanz Briz Oskar Schindler Anton Schmid Irena Sendler Klymentiy Sheptytsky Ona Šimaitė Henryk Sławik Tina Strobos Chiune Sugihara Casper ten Boom Corrie ten Boom Johan van Hulst Raimondo Viale Raoul Wallenberg Johan Hendrik Weidner Rudolf Weigl Jan Zwartendijk
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