In 2005, the historian Karl-Heinz Frieser summarized blitzkrieg as the result of German commanders using the latest technology in the most beneficial way according to traditional military principles and employing "the right units in the right place at the right time".[13] Modern historians now understand blitzkrieg as the combination of the traditional German military principles, methods and doctrines of the 19th century with the military technology of the interwar period.[14] Modern historians use the term casually as a generic description for the style of manoeuvre warfare practised by Germany during the early part of World War II, rather than as an explanation.[b] According to Frieser, in the context of the thinking of Heinz Guderian on mobile combined arms formations, blitzkrieg can be used as a synonym for modern manoeuvre warfare on the operational level.[15]
Blitzkrieg tactics were used in the successful German invasions of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France in 1940, which saw audacious applications of air power and airborne infantry to overcome fixed fortifications that were believed by the defenders to be impregnable. The Kesselschlacht campaigns on the Eastern Front were staggering in scale, with Kessels that covered vast swathes of territory, enveloping hundreds of thousands of troops. Blitzkrieg tactics were also used by the German commander Erwin Rommel during the desert campaigns in North Africa.

Blitzkrieg is vulnerable to an enemy that is robust enough to weather the shock of the attack and that does not panic at the idea of enemy formations in its rear area. This is especially true if the attacking formation lacks the reserve to keep funnelling forces into the spearhead, or lacks the mobility to provide infantry, artillery and supplies into the attack. If the defender can hold the shoulders of the breach they will have the opportunity to counter-attack into the flank of the attacker, potentially cutting off the van as happened to Kampfgruppe Peiper in the Ardennes.
The early 1950s literature transformed blitzkrieg into a historical military doctrine, which carried the signature of Liddell Hart and Guderian. The main evidence of Liddell Hart's deceit and "tendentious" report of history can be found in his letters to Erich von Manstein, Heinz Guderian and the relatives and associates of Erwin Rommel. Liddell Hart, in letters to Guderian, "imposed his own fabricated version of blitzkrieg on the latter and compelled him to proclaim it as original formula".[145][146] Kenneth Macksey found Liddell Hart's original letters to Guderian in the General's papers, requesting that Guderian give him credit for "impressing him" with his ideas of armoured warfare. When Liddell Hart was questioned about this in 1968 and the discrepancy between the English and German editions of Guderian's memoirs, "he gave a conveniently unhelpful though strictly truthful reply. ('There is nothing about the matter in my file of correspondence with Guderian himself except...that I thanked him...for what he said in that additional paragraph'.)".[147]
When we think of the crimes of Nazi doctors, what comes to mind are their cruel and sometimes fatal experiments… Yet when we turn to the Nazi doctors’ role in Auschwitz, it was not the experiments that were most significant. Rather, it was his participation in the killing process—indeed his supervision of Auschwitz mass murder from beginning to end. 1
In January 1945, as the Soviet army entered Krakow, the Germans ordered that Auschwitz be abandoned. Before the end of the month, in what came to be known as the Auschwitz death marches, an estimated 60,000 detainees, accompanied by Nazi guards, departed the camp and were forced to march to the Polish towns of Gliwice or Wodzislaw, some 30 miles away. Countless prisoners died during this process; those who made it to the sites were sent on trains to concentration camps in Germany.

Repeat selections took place several times during the day in roll calls. Inmates who had become weak or ill were separated from the ranks and sent to the gas chambers. A brutal regimen based on a set of punishments and torture was invoked in the camp. Few managed to survive. In Auschwitz-Birkenau, more than 1,100,000 Jews, 70,000 Poles, 25,000 Sinti and Roma (Gypsies) and some 15,000 prisoners of war from the USSR and other countries were murdered.


At the end of the war, in an effort to remove the traces of the crimes they had committed, the SS began dismantling and razing the gas chambers, crematoria, and other buildings, as well as burning documents. Prisoners capable of marching were evacuated into the depths of the German Reich, and thousands of marchers died of hunger, exhaustion and exposure. Those who remained behind in the camp and survived long enough were liberated by Red Army soldiers on 27 January 1945.
The concept of blitzkrieg was formed by Prussian military tactics of the early 19th century, which recognized that victory could come only through forceful and swift action because of Prussia’s relatively limited economic resources. It had its origins with the Schwerpunktprinzip (“concentration principle”) proposed by Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War (1832). Having studied generals who predated Napoleon, Clausewitz found that commanders of various armies had dispersed their forces without focused reasoning, which resulted in those forces’ being used inefficiently. So as to eliminate that wasteful use of manpower, he advocated for a concentration of force against an enemy. All employment of force should have an effective concentration in a single moment, with a single action, Clausewitz argued. Clausewitz called that concentration the Schwerpunkt (“centre of gravity”) where it was most dense, identifying it as the effective target for attack.
Nazi racial policy aimed at forcing Jews to emigrate.[109] Fifty thousand German Jews had left Germany by the end of 1934,[110] and by the end of 1938, approximately half the German Jewish population had left the country.[109] Among the prominent Jews who left was the conductor Bruno Walter, who fled after being told that the hall of the Berlin Philharmonic would be burned down if he conducted a concert there.[111] Albert Einstein, who was in the United States when Hitler came to power, never returned to Germany; he was expelled from the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Prussian Academy of Sciences and his citizenship was revoked.[112] Other Jewish scientists, including Gustav Hertz, lost their teaching positions and left the country.[113] On 12 March 1938, Germany annexed Austria. Austrian Nazis broke into Jewish shops, stole from Jewish homes and businesses, and forced Jews to perform humiliating acts such as scrubbing the streets or cleaning toilets.[114] Jewish businesses were "Aryanized", and all the legal restrictions on Jews in Germany were imposed.[115] In August that year, Adolf Eichmann was put in charge of the Central Agency for Jewish Emigration in Vienna (Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung in Wien). About 100,000 Austrian Jews had left the country by May 1939, including Sigmund Freud and his family, who moved to London.[116] The Évian Conference was held in July 1938 by 32 countries as an attempt to help the increased refugees from Germany, but aside from establishing the largely ineffectual Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, little was accomplished and most countries participating did not increase the number of refugees they would accept.[117]
Momentum needs to be maintained. For most companies the tailwinds change directions and the momentum disappears without anyone quite realizing what has happened. This is usually the case when the objective was not clearly defined to begin with. In Blitzkrieg the battle can and needs to have one of two outcomes: surrender or total annihilation. Ambiguous victory is never an option. Setting clear and unambiguous objectives is something that executives struggle with and that causes employees to lose their drive along the way.
The concept of blitzkrieg was formed by Prussian military tactics of the early 19th century, which recognized that victory could come only through forceful and swift action because of Prussia’s relatively limited economic resources. It had its origins with the Schwerpunktprinzip (“concentration principle”) proposed by Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War (1832). Having studied generals who predated Napoleon, Clausewitz found that commanders of various armies had dispersed their forces without focused reasoning, which resulted in those forces’ being used inefficiently. So as to eliminate that wasteful use of manpower, he advocated for a concentration of force against an enemy. All employment of force should have an effective concentration in a single moment, with a single action, Clausewitz argued. Clausewitz called that concentration the Schwerpunkt (“centre of gravity”) where it was most dense, identifying it as the effective target for attack.
By July 1944, Germany was losing the war; the SS began closing down the easternmost concentration camps and deporting the remaining prisoners westward. Many were killed in Auschwitz and the Gross-Rosen concentration camp. Schindler convinced SS-Hauptsturmführer Amon Göth, commandant of the nearby Kraków-Płaszów concentration camp, to allow him to move his factory to Brněnec in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, thus sparing his workers from almost certain death in the gas chambers. Using names provided by Jewish Ghetto Police officer Marcel Goldberg, Göth's secretary Mietek Pemper compiled and typed the list of 1,200 Jews who travelled to Brünnlitz in October 1944. Schindler continued to bribe SS officials to prevent the execution of his workers until the end of World War II in Europe in May 1945, by which time he had spent his entire fortune on bribes and black market purchases of supplies for his workers.
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